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Upscaling in order to capacitate local government 
An international comparison of arguments and practices of local government consolidation 
 
Michiel S. de Vries 
Abstract: 
This paper asks how the benefits of municipal amalgamations compare to the costs thereof. It answers this 
research question by comparing the postwar experiences with such consolidation in a variety of OECD 
countries. First, this paper argues that nowadays upscaling local and regional government is popular. 
Many Western countries have plans to upscale local government or have already implemented such plans. 
Various developments, such as the development in the welfare state, decentralization processes, and 
urbanization have pushed the possibilities for professional service delivery of small local systems to their 
limits. Hence, there are good reasons for upscaling. 
Second, this paper argued that processes towards public sector consolidation are mainly political 
processes. Vested interests, ideological framing, intergovernmental war, institutional and interpersonal 
conflicts and power play are central. Although these political processes can result in a variety of 
outcomes, all are indicative for some form of  upscaling. It seems inevitable, either by way of municipal 
mergers or by creating additional governmental layers taking over the service delivery of local 
governments, or by inter-municipal cooperation. Such upscaling does affect the professionalism of service 
delivery and the quality of local democracy, although previous research is divided about the answer to the 
question to which extent and in which direction the effects go. That research is based on the well-known 
Dahl-Tufte dilemma, mooted in 1973, in which better service delivery is balanced against the loss of 
citizen effectiveness. This paper argues that two other dilemmas might be as important.  
First, there might be a neutralizing effect of public sector upscaling annulling the merits of 
decentralization. Secondly, there is the serious consideration of long-term effects against temporary, 
transition costs. The transition costs result in the recommendation that if one wants to upscale, it is 
preferred to do it in one-go and not through repeated incremental processes. Without additional 
knowledge about the optimal size, upscaling can only be seen as gambling.  
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1. Introduction 
The position of local and regional government is under discussion all over the world. In the developing 
parts of the world, the dysfunction of these governmental layers is seen as the cause that the millennium 
development goals are not achieved (Kauzya, 2013). In the developed parts of the world, the capacity of 
local government is often judged insufficient to justify further decentralization, that is, the transfer of 
powers and authority for policy areas from the central to the local level (Council of European 
Municipalities & Regions, 2009). The capacity of subnational government has been an issue for a long 
time making many a central government reluctant to decentralize the authority on policy areas.  
This paper will argue that nowadays many countries, especially but not only in the latter category, seek the 
solution for capacitating local and regional government in upscaling these layers through amalgamations. 
Such process are pursued under different labels, notably “amalgamations”, “territorial consolidation”, 
“territorial reform strategies”, “mergers”, and “public sector combinations”. This paper uses these terms 
interchangeably.  
This paper addresses the background, frequency and consequences of such upscaling and, argues by 
decomposing the process towards territorial consolidation, that the transition costs thereof are high. 
Although research about the effects of upscaling is divided in its outcomes, the least one can say is that 
such reform processes always involve a difficult consideration of costs and benefits.  
How do the effects compare to the costs? In order to arrive at an answer to that question, the following 
sub-questions will structure this paper: 
 
1. To what degree has upscaling subnational government spread among countries? 
2. What is known about the different phases in such reform processes? 
3. What does this knowledge suggest regarding the way to proceed in this regard?   
 
The structure of this paper follows the three sub-questions. The first section will address the popularity of 
upscaling, followed by a section in which process towards upscaling is decomposed and each of the 
phases in such processes is described. This paper finishes with a discussion on the merits of such 
upscaling and the dilemmas involved. 
2. Upscaling is in fashion 
In Europe after WW II, the ﬁrst signs of upscaling were already seen in the 1950s. It started in Austria 
(halving the number of municipalities) and in Sweden (reducing them to less than an eighth of the original 
number). Subsequently other countries in Scandinavia, as well as in Western European countries such as 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and in Central European countries such as Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary followed (Swianiewicz, 2010, p. 16).  However, it is only during the last 
decade that we witness a massive popularity of upscaling in other countries and outside Europe too. In 
some countries, this became reality. In other countries there were plans, but these failed. First, again in 
Scandinavian countries: in Denmark the number of municipalities decreased from 275 to 98 between 2000 
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and 2010; in Finland from 436 to 342; in Iceland from 124 to 77; in the Faroe Islands from 49 to 30 and in 
Greenland from 18 to 4. In Western Europe, the process of upscaling also goes on. The Dutch continue 
incremental upscaling through amalgamation to a present number of 400 municipalities, which number 
exceeded 500 in the early 2000s and plan to reduce the number of municipalities to no more than 150 by 
the second half of this decade. Within roughly the same period, the 12 provinces have to be reduced to 
five counties. In Ireland, there are plans to upscale local government and reduce the number of regions 
from eight to three. In Canada, more specifically Quebec the Provincial Parliament passed a series of laws 
in 2000 that obliged municipalities to merge from 212 to 42 communes. At present in New Zealand, the 
prime minister wants to upscale local government, and Japan again plans to upscale local government by 
reducing its number by 40%, after it already had reduced the number of municipalities in the early 2000s 
also by 40%. The Japanese government's stated goal is to reduce the total number of Japanese 
municipalities to 1,000. In Greece, the Capodistrias Plan of 1997 reduced the number of municipalities 
from 5825 to 1033, although its original plan was to end up with 500 municipalities.  
As to Central and Eastern Europe, in Macedonia in 2004 as a consequence of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement the number of municipalities diminished from 123 to 84. In Georgia, after the Rose revolution 
the number of local governments was reduced from 998 to 64 in 2006 with five so-called provincial cities, 
i.e.  Tbilisi, Rustavi, Kutaisi, Batumi, and Poti. 
In other countries, amalgamations were hold in, but the autonomy of small communities was nevertheless 
reduced by intensified cooperation between them or between them and a central city. This happened in 
Hungary, where the government introduced so-called multipurpose micro-regional associations, which can 
comprise up to 65 municipalities around a larger town. It is also seen in the Czech Republic where 
municipalities cooperate intensively, especially in the areas of regional development, tourism and 
environmental protection and somewhat less in social infrastructure, energy, transport and waste disposal 
and in order to get European subsidies. (Vajdová and Čermák, 2006). Only in Lithuania, there were plans 
to increase the number of municipalities, because the government argued that because of the huge 
amalgamations in the 1990s in which the number of municipalities diminished from 581 to 56. This 
process had created municipalities that were too large according to Lithuanian government. Another 
special case is Slovakia. In this country, the often very small municipalities got a choice in 2004: either 
merge or intensify cooperation and at least have 5,000 inhabitants as a municipality. 
In the above resume, the upscaling in some countries must inevitably have been missed. The picture is 
nonetheless clear. In the more or less economically developed countries upscaling the subnational Public 
sector is in one way or the other, through inter-municipal cooperation or amalgamations, in plans or 
reality, in fashion. 
3. A decomposition of the process 
As Paweł Swianiewicz tells us: “it should not be naively seen as a painless remedy with no negative side 
effects” (2010, 15). A dilemma exists in the weighing of long-term benefits to enable local government to 
deal with increasingly complex problems, policies and spillover effects for which capacity is created 
through amalgamations, against the transition costs of such amalgamation. Such transition costs refer, not 
just to the planning costs or to moving officials from one office to the other, but especially to the more 
serious conflicts between national and subnational government, between the constituting partners in the 
municipality to be merged and between the local officials in the consolidated municipality. Below we 
describe the five phases such transition processes face in order to enable an analysis of such processes in 
the next section. One can distinguish the following sequence in such process:  
1. The driving forces behind upscaling; 
2. The arguments used in practice; 
3. The resistance of stakeholders; 
4. The decision-making process; 
5. The functioning of the new municipality immediately after amalgamation.  
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3.1. Phase 1. The driving factors behind upscaling 
Theories point to varying factors explaining public sector consolidation. They point to the emergence of 
the welfare state and the changing role of government in general and specifically the changing role of 
local government, urbanization, decentralization, and political reasoning. Brans (1992) summarized these 
theories.  First of all the emergence of the welfare state is a driving force behind upscaling. According to 
Kjellberg (1985) and Dente & Kjellberg (1988) in its first phase the increasing number of functions for 
government in the public sector, also made the importance of local government grow. It got more powers 
and authorities, and was seen as the governmental layer in which everything had to be implemented. This 
created pressures for rational and efficient administration. The more involved local authorities had 
traditionally been in social service delivery, the more likely it was that reorganization at this stage would 
resort to … amalgamation (Kjellberg 1988, p. 45; Brans, 1992, p. 431). During the second phase of the 
emergence of the welfare state, distributional policies became more important and the local level became 
involved in regional and labor market policies. During the third phase of expansion of the welfare state, 
these policies integrated resulting in a reconsideration of the financial intertwining between central and 
local government (ibid). All in all the burdens on local government increased, necessitating a certain mass 
at the local level in order to adequately take care of all these functions and hence the plans for 
consolidation. 
One can add a fourth phase, that is the retreat of the welfare state, in which due to the financial crisis, 
many functions are transferred from the central level (which cannot afford them anymore) to the local 
level, because of a combination of political and efficiency considerations. Policies become unaffordable 
because of budget deficits at the national level. Because it is often politically untenable to eliminate these 
policies, they are decentralized, so that the financial burden is transferred to the local level. 
The second theory explaining upscaling, points to demographic developments, notably urbanization, and 
intergovernmental developments, notably, decentralization (Sharpe, 1988, Brans, 1992). Both factors 
pushed the old local government borders to their limits. Because of urbanization cities expanded beyond 
their official borders and the many new functions out of decentralization accompanying their growth could 
not adequately been taken care of but in cooperation between cities and their more rural environment 
(hinterland) or under a common jurisdiction, e.g. mergers.   
The third explanation sees amalgamations as a political process. First, the need to protect the interests of 
the cities induces power politics in which the autonomy of the suburbs was to be diminished. Second, 
expected electoral gains use reorganizations in a kind of gerrymandering. Third, the need to have some 
balance between capitalism and democracy can be sought and provided at the local level. Fourth, 
upscaling is needed in order to ensure a continuous supply of 'high caliber’ councilors and officials (Brans, 
1992, 436).  
Other background factors cannot be neglected. The above three theories see upscaling as a political 
answer to an acknowledged societal need and governmental problems. Often upscaling is not a voluntary 
choice, but something forced upon society, as was clearly the case in central Europe after 1989. In those 
days and many of those countries outside pressures to simultaneously upscale sub-national government 
and decentralize power and authority to the local level are seen. Many a technical assistance program from 
the EU or US towards these countries in the 1990s aimed at empowering local government and 
diminishing centralization. The subsidiarity principle is crucial to the EU and many a reorganization in an 
EU member state was partly inspired or limited by the incentive of getting grants out of the regional 
development funds from Brussels. 
Finally, upscaling is deemed possible when other countries have successfully went through this process 
and there is a country in which the consolidation is seen as a best practice. In such a case, institutional 
mimesis becomes likely. This explanation central in policy diffusion theory is able to explain the timing 
thereof and the shifting popularity therein. It is seen in the first wave of amalgamations between the 1950s 
and 1960s and a second wave from the middle of the 1990s onwards. Where Austria and Sweden were 
seen as best practices in the 1950s, at present Denmark seems to be the prime example. In 2007 it 
rigorously upscaled its municipalities from 271 to 98 and its regions from 14 to 5 and economically it is 
not doing too bad. This is sufficient reason for other European countries to see it as a best practice and to 
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do something similar in the hope that it will produce the same effects (Council of European Municipalities 
and Regions, 2009).  
3.2. Phase 2. Arguments used in practice 
If such consolidation is as popular and needed as described above, one would expect that the driving 
forces provide ample arguments for successfully initiating amalgamations. However, in practice we see 
rather different arguments used and the ones being mentioned in theory are neglected. Politicians and 
policymakers in favor of upscaling use the most wonderful arguments to back their plans. They talk about 
efficiency, rationalization, improved service delivery, of an administration becoming friendlier to the 
inhabitants, able to cope with new tasks, promote local development, and oﬀer “modern social services” to 
their citizens, especially in rural areas (Greece). In Denmark, the main goal was meeting appropriate 
levels of expertise and addressing the problems in the delivery of core welfare services. In Germany 
enhancing the planning, administrative, capacity, and eﬃciency of local government units, while also 
ensuring and strengthening their local democracy potential was central (see Wolman 2004). The UK and 
Finland mentioned economies of scale, eﬃciency, and eﬀectiveness. Macedonia desired to secure the 
competence of municipalities able to cope with increased local government competencies, because the 
decentralization process envisaged a further increase of expenditure and revenues assignments. Georgia 
faced legal, social, and economic pressures, whereby local governments almost ceased to function and 
public services were only available in large cities. In Quebec, the main goal was the reduction of 
fragmentation and the desire to induce more accountability and transparency, which was said to be lacking 
in the inter-municipal cooperation structures. The policy makers in Hungary emphasized integration and 
streamlining public service nationwide and that upscaling establishes equal opportunities for access to 
public services. The prime minister of New Zealand talked about reducing the costs, to reduce 
unnecessary duplication and waste, to enable improved performance, cost savings and to increase 
productivity. The Japanese wanted to enable the transfer of administrative power to the local level. The 
Czech Republic wanted amalgamations because of a combination of economy of scale, better service 
provision, distributional equity, local economic development and strengthening of local democracy (Czech 
Republic). (cf. Swianiewicz, 2010) 
According to political proponents and policy makers aiming at public sector mergers, upscaling the Public 
Sector furthers all the quality criteria one would like to see coped with by the public sector. However, they 
hardly point to the long-term societal trends as mentioned in the theories on the subject, i.e. urbanization 
and welfare state developments. 
3.3. Phase 3. The resistance of stakeholders 
One of the reasons that policy makers try to back their plans with as many arguments as possible is 
because plans to upscale subnational government evoke a lot of resistance. Local and regional politicians 
will resist the plans. Vested interests make for local politicians who do not easily give up their local power 
positions in favor of a national plan to initiate amalgamations. They will even try to mobilize their 
followers, e.g. the local citizens to oppose the plans. In such discussions on can witness a lot of 
ideological framing, such as depicting the upscaling in terms of centralization, even though it goes hand in 
hand with further decentralization; in pointing to the loss of local identity; the increased distance between 
citizens and local government; the increasing bureaucracy et cetera. 
 
The opponents do have a point, even two points, as discussed below.  
Already in 1973, Dahl and Tufte posed the dilemma that larger municipalities tend to be more eﬀective 
providers of municipal services, e.g. have a larger system capacity, but are less democratic, e.g. citizen 
effectiveness. Smaller municipalities tend to have more possibilities for citizens to participate in 
policymaking processes and to have control over the decisions of the polity (local democracy), but could 
be less efficient and effective in service delivery (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 20).  
Empirical research into the matter is ambiguous. As to the so-called systems capacity, or economies of 
scale, the results of empirical research vary with:  
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 The nature of the unit investigated (schools, municipalities, police and fire departments, municipalities 
et cetera);  
 The supposed linearity of the relation between size and capacity: Some find a u-shaped relation, others 
a strong relation in case of merging very small municipalities but a decreasing or even absent relation 
when already reasonably large municipalities merge;  
 The investigated effect; be it efficiency, effectiveness et cetera; 
 The indicators used; be it the costs of local government, the percentage of salary costs to total 
expenditures; the number of complaints et cetera.   
 
As to the second part of the dilemma, one sees the same problems in the outcomes of research. It 
sometimes shows that local democracy indeed suffers from increasing municipality size (Denters 2002; 
Kelleher and Lowery 2004). Others found that direct democracy increases, at least up to a certain size of 
the municipality (Keating 1995; Frandsen 2002). The same problem as with system capacity is seen, as 
outcomes of research depend on the nature of the indicators, the policy area and the country investigated. 
For instance in Denmark Kjær and Mouritzen (2003) found that size has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the 
citizens attachment to the municipality, their interest for and knowledge of local politics, their trust and 
political self-confidence, but does impact on their participation in elections and participation in public 
policy processes. 
 
Secondly, many processes of upscaling are initiated out of the desire to transfer more authority to the local 
level, e.g. to decentralize. Such decentralization is preferred, because of the subsidiarity principle and the 
supposed advantages thereof, of which efficiency and local democracy are only two. Other supposed 
merits of decentralization are the possibilities to develop tailor-made policies, to achieve more flexibility, 
less bureaucracy, and better policies because of more commitment of officials, the short lines between 
stakeholders, the superior knowledge about local circumstances, and less redundancy in service delivery.  
There is a dilemma rooted in the need to upscale local government in order to enable decentralization, 
because such upscaling annuls some of the mentioned advantages of decentralization. If downscaling the 
responsibilities for policymaking through decentralization to the local level has the abovementioned 
effects, upscaling must almost by definition be expected to diminish the capacity to develop tailor-made 
policies; to increase bureaucracy, diminish flexibility, decrease the commitment of officials, lengthen the 
lines between stakeholders and result in more redundancy.   
The question is whether these disadvantages are seen (in all policy areas or especially in those policy areas 
already taken care of by the local government before the amalgamation became reality); and whether the 
constituting units of the new municipality are equally confronted with these disadvantages or some 
partners in the merger take the costs and others the benefits. 
3.4. Phase 4. Towards the decision to upscale 
Such resistance is easily vanquished if all power is centralized in the national government, as was, for 
instance, the case in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s under the then Communist regime. One stroke of the pen 
sufficed to reduce the number of municipalities with 20%.  
In democracies, especially when countries are already more or less decentralized, such power politics is 
less obvious. Such countries use other instruments, that is, communicative, legal and financial 
instruments. Persuasion is seen in the abuse of possible advantages of amalgamations as described above 
under phase 2. During the decision making process often the word “voluntary” appears, however, always 
accompanied by wielding a big stick. In Denmark, municipalities got one year to merge voluntarily, and if 
they did not comply, central government would impose it. In Finland and the Netherlands, the national 
governments use financial incentives to induce municipal mergers. In other countries, such as Greece and 
Georgia, the extent to which the authority over policies is decentralized depends on mergers. This was 
most clearly seen in Georgia where a combination of legal, social, and economic pressures, made small 
local governments almost cease to function. Public services were only available in large cities. This 
contributed to the drive for a new round of reform in 2004 (Melua, 2010, p. 159). In other cases the 
6 
 
voluntary character is only partial: municipalities can for instance choose with whom to amalgamate, but 
national government fixes the lower boundary in terms of number of citizens in the new municipality, for 
instance, 5,000 or 50,000 or as in the Netherlands nowadays 100,000 inhabitants. 
Resistance can be effective. In many regions (Länder) in Germany the small local government units did 
not merge, but added a new layer of inter-communal bodies of which the (small) municipalities became 
members, and which had the task of providing operational support to the latter. (cf. Swienaciz, 2010). The 
same happened, as described above, in Central European countries like Slovakia, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, and in Western democracies such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Quebec until 2000. 
In those cases, the small municipalities keep their mayor and sometimes their local council although 
democratic control of the shared tasks is often minimal. Such shared tasks are organized through joint 
authorities such as created in Finland, which provide educational, social and health-care services, 
“integrated” municipalities such as in Germany, or multipurpose micro-regional associations such as 
created in Hungary in 2004. 
To opt for inter-municipal cooperation instead of amalgamation is also seen in France, where communes 
cooperate within a community. 34166 small communes belong to 2406 Communautés de communes 
(community of communes), and 179 Communautés d’agglomération (CA) as well as 16 Communautés 
urbaines (Metropolitan cities). Furthermore the cooperation is strengthened through 16 11179 single-
purpose IMC unions (syndicats à vocation unique),  1445 multipurpose IMC unions (syndicats à vocation 
multiple) and 3064 unions with communes and other public legal persons, department, region, chambers 
of commerce, and even communities (syndicats mixtes) were established to ensure service delivery by the 
sometimes very small communes. 
Municipalities in the Netherlands experiment with a third option in order to intensify inter-municipal 
cooperation, but to remain politically independent, that is, to combine their administration, including all 
local officials, under the responsibility of separate political councils.   
Amalgamation or intensifying cooperation is a choice based on difficult considerations. On the one hand 
intensifying cooperation gives the idea that the local identity and democracy are preserved, while service 
delivery is professionally taken care of by inter-municipal organizations appointed by local councils. 
However, such institutional solutions make for fuzzy government with a democratic deficit in relation to 
the shared tasks. In general inter municipal cooperation is, therefore, a transitory step towards full 
amalgamation. In Quebec in 2000, the problems due to inter-municipal cooperation were one of the main 
arguments for full amalgamation. At present, these additional layers are also under discussion in the 
Netherlands and Belgium. 
3.5. Phase 5. The functioning of the new municipality 
When a new municipality is created the employees involved, almost by definition experience uncertainty. 
It is because of this uncertainty that many authors point to fears, anxieties and resulting resistance to 
change especially when employees lack understanding of the principles and merits of the reforms. From 
medical literature it even becomes clear that effects of uncertainty caused by large-scale workplace 
reorganization, on psychological well-being, blood pressure and total cholesterol levels are visible (cf.  
Pollard, 2001). Pollard concludes that workplace reorganization causes significant increases in distress 
and in systolic blood pressure and that uncertainty contributes to these effects. 
This uncertainty emerges first, because reforms often involve a change in the hierarchical relationships by 
either centralization or decentralization, or because of the creation of new dependency relations by 
privatizing or deprivatizing departments, or by creating independent agencies, government corporations, 
or incorporating a new organization within the executive branch (Cf. Thomas, 1993). During 
reorganizations positions are shuffled around, colleagues even subordinates may become bosses and 
bosses can be degraded, pushed aside or even fired, resulting in new and unknown relationships. 
The second way in which reorganizations result in uncertainty is because reorganizations can be seen as a 
violation of the psychological contract (Rousseau, 1995, Wellin, 2007; Sobis and De Vries, 2011). Wellin 
perceives the psychological contract as “the actions employees believe are expected of them and what 
response they expect in return from the employer” (2007: 27). In case of organizational change, a sense of 
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contract violation is likely to occur, resulting in negative impacts with regard to morale, self-esteem, 
organizational commitment, trust, job security, and productivity, and increased psychological disturbances 
(Stark et al, 2000). 
A second direct consequence of reorganizations is that the personal position and interests of employees 
may be at stake, resulting in physical, emotional, or psychological strain. This could be caused by cost-
cutting changes, adjustments in salaries or benefits, forced use of vacation or even very subtle acts of 
removing the coffee machine, artwork, limiting office-space, et cetera (cf. www.ExecutiveBlueprints.com) 
and the threat of being fired when the reorganization involves downsizing.  
Because of the uncertainty, threats and physical problems amongst employees, they shift attention from 
their daily work to organizational developments and are only focused on whether the reorganization will 
affect the nature of their work and working conditions. Especially when employees perceive the outcomes 
of the reform as unjust for themselves, they are more likely to leave their jobs, are less likely to cooperate, 
show lower levels of morale and higher levels of work stress and overt and covert disobedience, are more 
likely to initiate lawsuits, and may even start behaving in anti-social ways. 
A second probable indirect effect of reorganizations is found in the inclination of employees to resist 
further reorganizations and reforms. One might expect them to show conservatism, or in terms of the 
rationalities distinguished by Max Weber to adhere more and more to a traditional rationality. Preferring 
the way things are arranged at present even though further reforms might be advantageous to their 
organization. 
A third probable indirect consequence of reorganizations is that interpersonal relations between public 
administrators become disturbed. Previous research out that especially hectic and dynamism in the work 
environment are causes of interpersonal conflicts (Marcellisen, 1988). Furthermore, if there are large 
power differences it becomes harder to arrive at solutions and conflicts are more persistent (Kriesberg, 
1993). This is especially the case when dominant positions are in dispute and ambiguous (Smyth, 1994), 
when power shifts occur, or otherwise fundamental changes take place in the context (Putnam & 
Wodolleck, 2003), and especially if the workplace is perceived as chaotic (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 
2004). Especially reorganizations may have the side effect that they result in a division within the 
organization between people who profit from and people who are disadvantaged by the change. As said 
above, reorganizations may result in (temporary) uncertainty and ambiguity about the new situation and 
consequently result in behavioral mistakes by individual public officials, which in turn can be interpreted 
by others as resistance to the new situation the newly established hierarchy, thus resulting in an 
interpersonal conflict between public officials (cf. de Vries, 2010, Venner & de Vries, 2012). In the 
Netherlands, local officials see such interpersonal conflicts as the main inhibitor for policy development in 
their municipality (de Vries, 2010). 
4. Discussion 
Analyzing the process of reforms implicated by the need to upscale sub-national government, does not 
present a pleasant picture. The process is full of conflict, ideology, fear, and negative side effects. First, 
many an argument used by policy makers for amalgamations just reflects ideological framing, not 
referring to the real reasons. Consolidation is about neither efficiency, economies of scale, or 
distributional equity, nor about democracy, as the Dahl-Tufte dilemma suggests. It is rather the political 
answer to problems that befall a system and make the system creak on its edges (expansion of the welfare 
state, decentralization, urbanization, difficulties in finding political representatives) or are imposed on a 
country by the international system. 
Secondly, during the process, the envisaged problems and conflicts increase: first at the macro level, 
subsequently at the institutional level and finally at the individual level. Processes to upscale sub-national 
government are indeed painful processes likely to result in a temporary standstill in policy development in 
the new municipality, because of the internal orientation such processes induce among all stakeholders. 
They will be mainly concerned with questions about their own individual position vis-à-vis others and the 
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position of their organization vis-à-vis other organizations. Decision makers have to balance these 
transition costs against the long-term benefits of upscaling. 
Although the Dahl Tufte dilemma, balancing service-delivery against democracy, is best known and 
dominant in the scholarly research into the effects of amalgamations, the dilemma sketched above, 
between long-term gains and transition costs involved in the process of upscaling might be as important. 
Research into this dilemma could provide policymakers with instruments and procedures that ease the 
process and reduce the transition costs. Such research could point to the need of substituting imposition of 
upscaling from the top by involvement of all stakeholders in the decision-making process. Such research 
could also result in a reconsideration of taking an incremental approach by the stepwise upscaling local 
governments which governments often opt for in order to reduce opposition. It is dubious whether such 
step-by-step processes are indeed expedient. It may seem that incrementalism makes such processes 
manageable, because it is a way to smuggle changes into the political system (Lindblom, 1979) but in the 
end, such an approach might well multiply the problems and conflicts at the individual level, because of 
the repeated reforms it entails. Perhaps a reform in one-go is to be preferred.  
The third dilemma in need of more research is related to the effects consolidation has in relation to 
decentralization. To which degree does amalgamation annul the expected benefits of decentralization? Is it 
indeed the case that if downscaling the responsibilities for policymaking through decentralization to the 
local level results in tailor-made policies, less bureaucracy, more flexibility and commitment of officials, 
shorter lines between stakeholders and less redundancy, that upscaling negates these effects? Research 
into these aspects of decentralization could point to an optimal size of municipalities given the cultural 
and socio-economic context. It could prevent problems as experienced at present in Lithuania, where the 
upscaling of municipalities apparently went too far and splitting the too large municipalities is nowadays a 
realistic policy-option. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper asked how the benefits of municipal amalgamations compare to the costs thereof. It answers 
this research question by comparing the postwar experiences with such upscaling in a variety of OECD 
countries. The existing literature on the subject is extensive. For every country, accounts are available of 
such upscaling processes. But the research is also divided in its evaluation of effects of such consolidation. 
Nonetheless, this paper showed that nowadays upscaling local and regional government is popular. Many 
Western countries have plans to upscale local government or have already implemented such plans. 
Various developments, such as the development in the welfare state, decentralization processes, and 
urbanization have pushed the possibilities for professional service delivery of small local systems to their 
limits. Hence, there are good reasons for upscaling. 
However, such upscaling is not an easy process. This paper argued that notwithstanding the good reasons 
for upscaling, processes towards public sector consolidation are likely to become political and painful 
processes. Vested interests, ideological framing, intergovernmental war, institutional and interpersonal 
conflicts and power play are visible. The political nature of such processes makes proponents overstate the 
merits by uttering the most wonderful objectives, after which opponents are entitled to point to the 
uncertainties involved. Not all expectations about such reforms, especially those mentioned by the policy 
makers and politicians initiating such consolidation, are evidence based.  
Although these political processes can result in a variety of outcomes, all are indicative for some form of 
upscaling. This paper argued that upscaling is inevitable, either by way of municipal mergers or by 
creating additional governmental layers taking over the service delivery of local governments, or by inter-
municipal cooperation. Such upscaling does affect the professionalism of service delivery and the quality 
of local democracy, although previous research is divided about the answer to the question to which extent 
and in which direction. Most of that research is based on the well-known Dahl-Tufte dilemma, mooted in 
1973, in which better service delivery is balanced against the loss of citizen effectiveness.  
This paper argued that two other dilemmas might be as important.  
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First, there might be a neutralizing effect of public sector upscaling in relation to the merits of 
decentralization. It might well be that the merits of downscaling through decentralization are negated by 
the upscaling of local government. Second, there is the serious consideration of long-term effects against 
temporary, transition costs.  
Both dilemmas beg the question whether there is an optimum size of local government within a specific 
politico-cultural and socio-economic context. Clearly professional service delivery cannot be expected 
when a municipality is too small to attract the needed professionals or when it is unable to create the 
needed professionalism. On the other hand, there might be a u-shape relation between size and quality of 
service delivery in which case municipalities also can become too large. The Lithuanian experience points 
to this problem. 
Without an answer to this question and taking the transition costs seriously, policy makers face a real 
dilemma. On the one hand the transition costs result in the recommendation that if one wants to upscale, it 
is preferred to do it in one-go and not through repeated incremental processes. On the other hand, lacking 
knowledge about the optimal size of subnational government, upscaling is at best an educated guess, and 
at worst gambling putting taxpayers money, local democracy and the commitment of local officials at 
stake. Statisticians dissuade gambling, especially repeated gambling, because eventually it will ruin the 
gambler. They also tell us that if one needs to gamble, it is wise to do it as little as possible and to take the 
odds seriously. 
Thinking it through, being careful in timing, abstaining from ideological framing and overstating the 
effects, involving all stakeholders, making the process transparent from the start, mitigating negative side 
effects, and hiring mediators that can resolve the invitable interpersonal conflicts, is the least one can ask 
for. 
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